What’s Wrong With José Berríos?

Right here’s a factor that you might say about José Berríos: he’s been a awful pitcher this yr. I don’t even assume he would argue with you on that one; after signing a seven-year, $131 million cope with the Blue Jays, he’s having comfortably his worst season within the majors. His 5.28 ERA is greater than a run increased than his profession mark coming into the yr regardless of the declining offensive surroundings. He’s placing fewer batters out and giving up residence runs at an alarming fee. Whether or not you’re speaking about superior or commonplace metrics, new faculty or old-fashioned, it’s been a catastrophe of a yr.

Right here’s one other factor you might say about Berríos: he’s a stable pitcher who’s sticking with the strategy that obtained him right here within the first place. When you thought he was good final yr — and also you in all probability did, provided that he put up a mid-3s ERA in each Minnesota and Toronto with the peripherals to match — you’d count on him to be good once more this yr. He’s not dropping velocity. He didn’t change his pitch combine. He didn’t all of a sudden lose command of the zone. What the heck is going on right here?

Earlier than we go any additional on this investigation, I’m going to spoil the conclusion somewhat bit: I don’t know the reply. I don’t assume there’s an apparent reply in any respect, in truth. If there have been, I’m pretty sure the Jays would have figured it out by now. No matter’s ailing Berríos, it’s someplace on the margins.

Extra particularly, it’s one thing going unsuitable along with his four-seam fastball. When you check out run values by pitch kind, that a lot is clear:

When Berríos has been at his finest, he’s gotten acceptable manufacturing out of his four-seamer as a setup pitch and phenomenal outcomes when he throws his sinker. Due to his launch level, he’s by no means been the sort to blow four-seamers previous hitters up within the zone; his model of the pitch has as a lot tail as experience, which suggests it’s much less climbing over opposing bats than boring in on them.

That wasn’t an existential drawback prior to now. A subpar particular person pitch can nonetheless be helpful, whether or not mitigating a platoon drawback, offering assist for particular counts or sport conditions, or merely giving a hitter extra pitches to consider. Berríos throws his four-seamer extra when he’s behind within the depend than forward, and extra to lefties than righties. In different phrases, he makes use of it to flee from dangerous conditions. The sinker is used equally, however make no mistake: the 2 are totally different pitches. Right here’s the place he throws the four-seamer:

And the sinker:

From 2017 via ’21, that four-seam plan labored nicely sufficient. Not one of the pitch’s uncooked measurables have been notably spectacular; as I already lined, the form doesn’t lend itself to lacking bats up within the zone. That meant below-average swinging-strike, whiff, and in-zone contact numbers. That every one sounds dangerous, however bear in mind, he principally used it in conditions the place a swinging strike could be much less useful than regular: down within the depend or in opposition to batters who had the platoon edge.

Whenever you begin from behind, permitting contact isn’t essentially a foul factor. In mixture, batters put up a .273/.497/.470 line after getting forward within the depend 2–0, good for a 179 wRC+ and .424 wOBA. When batters put Berríos’s four-seamer in play from ‘17 to ‘21, they managed a a .417 wOBA. That’s in the event that they put it in play; they took loads for strikes and fouled loads extra off. Positive, everybody wish to have an unhittable four-seamer like Jacob deGrom, however there’s worth in an affordable off-ramp.

That off-ramp has was a automotive crash this season. Opposing hitters are completely tattooing the pitch, batting .441 after they put it into play and slugging .795, which works out to a .528 wOBA. If that have been a single batter’s line, he’d have the fourth-best manufacturing in opposition to fastballs within the majors this yr, higher than Paul Goldschmidt or Mike Trout. That’s as dangerous because it sounds; you in all probability shouldn’t throw a pitch if it turns your opponent into an MVP candidate.

Is it dangerous luck? Dangerous luck is a good way to hand-wave pitching issues. “Oh, sprinkle somewhat BABIP regression on it, he’ll be again to regular very quickly” is a time-honored means of papering over any issues. However I don’t assume that’s the case right here. A full third of the four-seamers Berríos has thrown this yr have been over the center of the plate, the best mark of his profession. That quantity has been climbing over time; more and more, he’s resorting to floating one in there to get again into the depend. It’s labored from a limiting walks perspective, however it’s no shock that opponents have more and more clobbered his four-seamers. Filling the zone isn’t all the time a foul factor, however it’s a foul factor if you’re throwing loads of these pitches proper down foremost road.

It’s not that hitters are all of a sudden tagging piped Berríos four-seamers extra; in truth, their manufacturing after they put a middle-middle four-seamer into play has been fairly steady through the years. However right here’s one thing scary: 17.3% of all of the batted balls he’s allowed this yr have been the results of four-seamers over the center of the plate. That compares to 13.8% in his profession prior to now. That’s an additional 15 batted balls that opponents are hitting below optimum circumstances, and that basically issues. When batters have put the ball in play on any pitch different than a middle-middle four-seamer in opposition to Berríos, they produce a .344 wOBA. Once they put middle-middle four-seamers into play, that jumps to .455. That’s twice the hole that pitchers see in mixture; Berríos’s four-seamer is especially vulnerable to getting launched, possible resulting from its unremarkable form.

What’s so bizarre about all of that is that Berríos has a wonderfully good fastball to make use of! His sinker may really be his finest pitch; he will get a ton of arm-side run on it, which makes for uncomfortable swings from righties and hey-how’d-that-get-here referred to as strikes in opposition to lefties. Over the course of his profession, it’s been his finest pitch, and as an additional benefit, it units up his wipeout breaking ball because of their divergent spin and motion profiles.

If I had Berríos’s sinker and curveball (some methods name it a slider, however no matter you wish to name it, it’s glorious), I’d attempt to throw them as typically as potential. He solely throws them a mixed 56% of the time, although. There’s loads of useless air being stuffed along with his four-seamer and a fringy changeup. Positive, selection is the spice of life, however when you’re getting demolished on one fastball however dominating hitters with the opposite, I do know which one I’d throw extra typically.

Batters are catching on to Berríos’s unusual fastball preferences. They’ve by no means swung extra typically at his in-zone four-seamers. They’ve by no means swung much less typically at his in-zone sinkers. As long as he’s providing up juicy pitches to hit, batters will proceed down that street. If I have been sport planning in opposition to Berríos, I’d begin the report with an enormous daring observe about attacking his weakest pitch, the one which he throws excess of he ought to and in exploitable areas.

Would rectifying his dangerous season be as simple as chopping his four-seam utilization in half? It sounds reductive, however I feel it would do the trick. It’s not clear what he’d do to switch these pitches, precisely; his changeup isn’t scaring anyone. However heck, why not simply throw extra sinkers? Toronto lastly has an excellent protection to place behind him, the seventh-best infield protection per Statcast. Feed them! All the opposite plans I may consider — altering fastball form, finding higher, including a greater changeup — are a lot tougher than simply altering up your pitch combine.

May this plan backfire? Completely. It places extra of a premium on management, as a result of batters swing much less ceaselessly at his sinkers. If I have been Berríos, I’d be keen to emphasize my management, although; he’s solely strolling 5.7% of his opponents this yr, and he’s been a constant strike-thrower all through his profession. Getting right into a strike zone contest with Berríos will finish poorly for loads of batters, however getting right into a fastball-clobbering contest will ceaselessly finish with a leisurely stroll across the bases.

On the finish of the day, crucial a part of pitching is preserving runs off the board, and Berríos hasn’t been as much as the duty this yr. However there’s room for optimism, as a result of for essentially the most half, he nonetheless possesses the instruments that made him an efficient starter for years. The Jays and Berríos principally know what’s wrong. They’re making an attempt to work on his fastball areas. However I ponder if they might skip that solely and simply discover a new pitch combine that works higher.

Notice: All statistics on this article are via video games of 8/28. Berríos made one other begin final evening and took my recommendation, throwing his four-seamer solely 16% of the time. He nonetheless gave up ten hits (although no residence runs) in 5.2 innings.